Michael Phillips | People’s Law Review
The Reichert litigation presents a recurring but underexamined problem in American family courts: what happens when proceedings continue while a disabled litigant is denied meaningful access—and the exclusion itself becomes outcome-determinative.
Although the underlying dispute arises from a family-law matter, the legal questions implicated are structural and constitutional, centering on federal disability law, procedural due process, and the limits of state-court discretion.
I. The Federal Access Ruling as a Threshold Determination
On January 13, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order in Reichert v. Hornbeck, granting Jeffrey Reichert the right to appear remotely for all pretrial proceedings as a reasonable accommodation under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
The court expressly found that:
- Reichert is a qualified individual with a disability (PTSD);
- In-person appearances and interstate travel substantially impair his ability to participate;
- Remote participation is a reasonable accommodation that does not impose undue burden; and
- Meaningful access to judicial proceedings requires accommodation in pretrial matters.
This ruling aligns with established Supreme Court precedent recognizing that access to courts is a fundamental right protected by federal disability law.
See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531–34 (2004) (holding that Title II of the ADA validly enforces the constitutional right of access to courts and requires reasonable accommodations by state judicial systems).
II. Family Court Proceedings Continued During Pending ADA Dispute
Despite the pending accommodation requests, filings indicate that at least five hearings in the Anne Arundel County family court matter proceeded without Reichert’s participation.
The procedural posture raises a critical question:
Can a court proceed, create a record, and impose procedural consequences while access itself remains unresolved?
Federal courts have repeatedly cautioned that procedural fairness requires more than formal notice—it requires a genuine opportunity to be heard.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (due process requires “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”).
Where a litigant’s absence is caused by denied access rather than neglect or refusal, proceeding risks converting structural exclusion into de facto waiver.
III. Distinguishing “Non-Appearance” from Exclusion
Family courts routinely treat non-appearance as a litigant failure. Disability law requires a different inquiry.
Courts must distinguish between:
- Voluntary non-appearance, and
- Absence caused by unresolved access barriers.
Failure to do so risks penalizing the exercise of federally protected rights.
See Seremeth v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Frederick Cnty., 673 F.3d 333, 338–40 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that public entities must make reasonable accommodations to avoid excluding disabled individuals from participation).
See also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (public entities must make reasonable modifications to avoid discrimination unless doing so would fundamentally alter the service).
IV. Retaliation and Procedural Penalties
Reichert’s emergency filings in state court explicitly warned against dismissal or adverse action for non-appearance while ADA issues remained pending.
This concern is not speculative.
The ADA and Rehabilitation Act prohibit retaliation against individuals for asserting protected rights.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (prohibiting retaliation against individuals for exercising ADA rights).
Courts have recognized that procedural sanctions—including dismissal or adverse inferences—can constitute unlawful retaliation when imposed as a consequence of protected activity.
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (retaliation includes actions that would deter a reasonable person from exercising protected rights).
Proceeding while access is denied, then penalizing the resulting absence, raises precisely that risk.
V. Federal Supremacy and State Court Obligations
State courts are not exempt from federal disability law.
See Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (“The unequal treatment of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services has a long history, and has persisted despite several legislative efforts to remedy the problem.”).
Nor may state procedural rules override federal access obligations.
See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990) (state courts may not apply procedural rules that undermine federal rights).
When family courts proceed under relaxed procedural norms while access disputes remain unresolved, they risk subordinating federal civil-rights protections to docket efficiency.
VI. Structural Implications Beyond Reichert
The Reichert case illustrates a systemic vulnerability:
- Family courts move quickly;
- ADA adjudication moves slowly;
- Exclusion occurs in the gap.
By the time federal review occurs, hearings may already have concluded, records may have hardened, and procedural consequences may be difficult to unwind.
This sequencing problem suggests the need for ex ante safeguards, not post hoc remedies.
VII. Toward a Doctrinally Coherent Approach
From a legal standpoint, several principles emerge:
- Access determinations must precede merits proceedings when disability barriers are alleged.
- Courts should not presume waiver or non-compliance where access is disputed.
- Temporary pauses or provisional accommodations are constitutionally safer than proceeding without participation.
- Procedural penalties imposed during unresolved access disputes raise serious ADA and due-process concerns.
These principles do not require altering custody standards or family-law doctrine. They require recognizing that access is a prerequisite to adjudication, not a collateral issue.
Conclusion
The Reichert litigation does not ask courts to favor disabled parents. It asks them to recognize that justice cannot proceed before access exists.
Federal law already answers the question. The remaining issue is whether family courts will operationalize that answer—or continue to treat access as optional until exclusion becomes irreversible.
For courts tasked with deciding the most consequential matters of family life, that choice carries constitutional weight.
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