By Michael Phillips | People’s Law Review
On June 28, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court issued one of the most consequential administrative law rulings in decades in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo.
In a 6–3 decision, the Court formally overturned the long-standing doctrine of Chevron deference, established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc..
For forty years, Chevron had shaped how federal courts reviewed agency regulations. Its demise represents a fundamental shift in the balance of power between federal agencies, courts, and Congress, with implications stretching far beyond environmental regulation or fisheries policy.
In practical terms, the ruling means federal agencies no longer receive automatic judicial deference when interpreting ambiguous statutes. Instead, courts must independently determine what the law means.
For critics of administrative overreach, the decision represents a restoration of constitutional structure. For defenders of the administrative state, it raises concerns about judicial activism and regulatory instability.
Either way, the decision marks the end of one of the most influential doctrines in modern administrative law.
The Chevron Doctrine: Four Decades of Agency Power
To understand the significance of Loper Bright, it is necessary to understand the doctrine it overturned.
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Chevron v. NRDC, establishing what became known as Chevron deference.
Under Chevron, courts reviewing agency regulations followed a two-step framework:
- Step One: Determine whether Congress clearly addressed the issue in the statute.
- Step Two: If the statute was ambiguous or silent, defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it was “reasonable.”
This doctrine effectively gave federal agencies broad authority to interpret ambiguous statutes within their regulatory domain.
Over time, Chevron became one of the most cited doctrines in administrative law. Courts applied it across a wide range of regulatory areas, including:
- environmental regulation
- healthcare policy
- labor rules
- telecommunications
- immigration policy
- defense administration
Critics argued the doctrine shifted lawmaking authority from Congress to unelected bureaucrats, while supporters maintained it allowed agencies with technical expertise to implement complex statutory schemes.
For decades, Chevron shaped the modern administrative state.
The Case That Ended Chevron
The dispute that ultimately led to Chevron’s demise began in the Atlantic fishing industry.
Family-owned fishing companies, including Loper Bright Enterprises, challenged a regulation issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.
The rule required fishing vessels to pay the salaries of federally mandated at-sea observers, third-party monitors placed aboard vessels to collect regulatory data.
The cost was significant — up to $710 per day for some fishermen.
While the statute explicitly authorized government funding for observers in certain fisheries, it was silent regarding who should bear the cost in the Atlantic herring fishery.
The agency interpreted the law to allow the government to require fishermen themselves to pay for the observers.
Lower courts upheld the regulation, applying Chevron deference. Because the statute did not clearly address the funding issue, the courts deferred to the agency’s interpretation as “reasonable.”
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case — and ultimately used it to reconsider Chevron itself.
The Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion
Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett.
The Court held that Chevron deference conflicts with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
Specifically, the Court pointed to 5 U.S.C. §706, which instructs courts to:
“decide all relevant questions of law” and determine whether agency actions are lawful.
According to the majority, Chevron improperly required courts to abandon independent judgment when statutes were ambiguous.
The Court rejected the idea that statutory ambiguity automatically represents an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to administrative agencies.
Instead, courts must interpret statutes using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, including:
- textual analysis
- statutory structure
- legislative context
- established interpretive canons
The Court emphasized the judiciary’s constitutional role under Article III to determine what the law is, citing the foundational case of Marbury v. Madison.
In other words, ambiguity does not mean agencies get to decide the law.
Courts do.
What Replaces Chevron?
The Court did not eliminate all forms of agency influence.
Instead, it clarified that courts may still consider agency expertise through persuasive reasoning, commonly associated with Skidmore deference.
Under this approach, agency interpretations may carry weight depending on factors such as:
- the thoroughness of the agency’s reasoning
- consistency of interpretation over time
- technical expertise
- persuasiveness of the analysis
However, the key difference is crucial:
Courts are no longer required to defer.
Agency interpretations now compete with other legal arguments rather than automatically receiving preference.
The Dissent: A Warning About Judicial Power
Justice Elena Kagan authored the dissent, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor and, in part, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson.
The dissent warned that overturning Chevron would disrupt decades of administrative law and transfer policymaking authority to the judiciary.
Kagan argued that agencies possess technical expertise and institutional capacity that courts lack.
According to the dissent:
- Congress often writes statutes intentionally broadly
- agencies are designed to fill in policy details
- courts lack the scientific or regulatory expertise necessary to do so
The dissent warned the ruling could produce legal instability and regulatory uncertainty as courts begin reassessing thousands of agency interpretations.
The Broader Impact on the Administrative State
The decision in Loper Bright immediately reshapes how courts review federal regulations.
Several consequences are already emerging.
1. Increased Litigation
Regulated industries now have stronger grounds to challenge agency rules.
Without Chevron’s protective shield, courts must independently assess whether agency interpretations are legally correct.
2. Greater Judicial Oversight
Federal judges will now play a more active role in interpreting statutes governing regulatory programs.
This effectively shifts interpretive authority from agencies to courts.
3. Pressure on Congress
Because agencies can no longer rely on ambiguity to expand authority, Congress may face pressure to draft more precise legislation.
4. Regulatory Uncertainty
Existing regulations previously upheld under Chevron may now face renewed challenges.
This could affect sectors including:
- environmental regulation
- financial regulation
- healthcare policy
- immigration enforcement
- national defense administration
Implications for Military Programs and Due Process
Beyond traditional regulatory fields, Loper Bright may also affect administrative processes within the Department of Defense, including programs like the Family Advocacy Program (FAP) and its Incident Determination Committee (IDC).
The IDC reviews allegations of domestic abuse within military families and determines whether the evidence meets criteria for abuse findings.
Critics have long argued that IDC proceedings lack procedural protections common in judicial proceedings.
Concerns include:
- no right to legal counsel during proceedings
- no cross-examination of witnesses
- no formal evidentiary rules
- no official transcript of hearings
- decisions based on a preponderance of evidence standard
Despite these limitations, IDC determinations can have serious career consequences for service members, including:
- administrative separation
- loss of security clearance
- impact on promotion opportunities
- influence in family court disputes
Before Loper Bright, courts reviewing such administrative processes often deferred to agency interpretations of governing statutes and internal directives.
That dynamic may now change.
A New Opening for Legal Challenges
Without Chevron deference, courts reviewing administrative actions involving military programs must independently determine whether agencies possess statutory authority for their procedures and decisions.
Potential legal challenges may now focus on questions such as:
- whether Congress explicitly authorized the structure of programs like IDC
- whether administrative procedures satisfy constitutional due process requirements
- whether agency interpretations of statutory authority exceed congressional intent
While Loper Bright does not automatically invalidate programs like the IDC, it removes a significant legal shield that previously insulated agency interpretations from judicial scrutiny.
Advocates for reform argue the ruling strengthens the ability of service members and veterans to challenge administrative decisions affecting their careers and reputations.
A Turning Point in Administrative Law
For decades, Chevron deference symbolized the rise of the modern administrative state.
With its overturning, the Supreme Court has signaled a dramatic recalibration of the constitutional balance among the branches of government.
The decision reflects a broader judicial trend toward reasserting the role of courts in interpreting statutes and limiting the scope of administrative authority.
Whether this shift ultimately strengthens democratic accountability or creates regulatory instability remains a matter of intense debate.
What is certain, however, is that the Chevron era has ended.
And the legal landscape governing federal agencies — from environmental regulators to military administrative systems — will now be shaped by a very different set of rules.
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